Practices and Procedures · Requirements for Enrolled Agents
Rules for prompt disposition of matters before the IRS
tax year · reviewed 2026-08-18 · I. Ohu
Section 10.23 is the shortest rule in Circular 230: a practitioner may not unreasonably delay the prompt disposition of any matter before the Internal Revenue Service. One sentence, no exceptions, no definitions. Its brevity is why it is almost never charged alone — it is the rule that describes what a practitioner was doing while breaching something else.
The rule
The whole of it. A practitioner may not unreasonably delay the prompt disposition of any matter before the IRS (Circular 230 § 10.23).
What the words carry. “Unreasonably” imports a standard rather than a period — there is no stated number of days, and delay that is reasonable in the circumstances is not a violation. “Any matter” is unrestricted: examination, collection, appeals, a ruling request, a disciplinary inquiry.
How it is sanctioned. Section 10.23 sits in subpart B, so a willful violation of it is sanctionable under § 10.52(a)(1). It is not one of the four sections — §§ 10.34, 10.35, 10.36 and 10.37 — that § 10.52(a)(2) makes violable recklessly or through gross incompetence. On its own terms, then, delay must be willful to be sanctionable.
Where the same conduct is also something else. Failing to submit records promptly on a proper and lawful request breaches § 10.20(a); interfering with the IRS’s effort to obtain them breaches § 10.20(b). Contemptuous conduct in connection with practice is § 10.51(a)(12). Advising a client to submit a paper whose purpose is to delay or impede the administration of the federal tax laws is § 10.34(b)(2)(i) — and if the client acts on it, the submission may draw the § 6702 frivolous submission penalty.
In court, delay has its own price. The Tax Court may impose up to $25,000 imposed by the Tax Court, and up to $10,000 in a section 7433 proceeding in another courtTY2026 where proceedings were instituted or maintained primarily for delay, and may require counsel who has multiplied proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously to pay excess costs personally (IRC § 6673(a)).
How it works in practice
Delay for the client’s benefit is the classic case. A practitioner who lets a deadline drift because the client is not ready, or who declines to answer a request until the collection statute is closer to expiring, is not managing a workload — they are using delay as a strategy, and that is what “unreasonably” is aimed at. The intent behind the delay is what separates the two.
Ordinary practice pressures are not violations. Missing a date because of illness, a genuine backlog, or waiting on a third party who has been chased is not unreasonable delay. What matters is whether the practitioner is doing what a competent practitioner would do about it: asking for an extension, telling the officer why, and keeping a record of both.
It is almost always a companion charge. Because willfulness is required and the section defines nothing, OPR rarely rests on § 10.23 by itself. It appears alongside § 10.20 where records were withheld, alongside § 10.51(a)(12) where the conduct was obstructive, and alongside the abandonment of a client where the real complaint is neglect. Reading a charge under § 10.23 as trivial because the rule is short misjudges it.
The client’s instruction is not a defence. A practitioner instructed to stall has a conflict between the instruction and § 10.23. The instruction does not license the delay; the practitioner’s obligations under Circular 230 run to their own conduct.
Neglect and delay look identical from outside and are charged differently. A practitioner who simply stops working a file — no strategy, no instruction, just inattention — has delayed the matter, but on the face of it not willfully, so § 10.23 is a poor fit. What that conduct usually engages instead is § 10.22’s diligence obligation, and where the client is left without representation at a deadline, the abandonment is the substance of the complaint. The distinction is worth drawing early in any inquiry: § 10.23 alleges a choice, § 10.22 alleges a failure.
Waiting out the statute
A practitioner holds a client's substantiation for a collection matter and answers each request slowly, on the client's instruction, because the collection statute expiration date is fourteen months away and the client hopes to run it out.
Analysis. This is what § 10.23 prohibits, and it is willful, so § 10.52(a)(1) engages. It is also likely to breach § 10.20(a)(1), which requires prompt submission on a proper and lawful request. The client's instruction is not a defence to the practitioner's own conduct. And the strategy is poor advice besides: requesting a CDP hearing or submitting an offer would suspend the collection period under § 6330(e)(1) or § 6331(k)(3), so delay tactics that provoke either response extend the very date the client is waiting for.
A backlog, handled properly
An enrolled agent is hospitalised during an examination and misses two document deadlines. On returning she telephones the examiner, explains, agrees a revised schedule and confirms it in writing.
Analysis. No violation. Section 10.23 prohibits unreasonable delay, and delay arising from genuine incapacity, addressed as soon as the practitioner is able, is not unreasonable. The conduct that makes it defensible is the response, not the absence of delay: contacting the examiner, agreeing a schedule, documenting it. Silence for the same two months would look very different.
The paper filed to slow things down
A client asks his practitioner to file a request for a collection due process hearing on grounds the practitioner considers meritless, expressly to postpone a levy for a few months.
Analysis. Section 10.34(b)(2)(i) bars advising a client to submit a paper the purpose of which is to delay or impede the administration of the federal tax laws, and § 10.23 catches the practitioner's own participation in the delay. If the ground is a listed frivolous position, the client also faces the § 6702(b) penalty on a specified frivolous submission — a CDP request is one — and the thirty-day withdrawal in § 6702(b)(3) becomes the only escape.
Traps
The standard is "unreasonably", not a fixed period. Circumstances decide.
Section 10.23 needs willfulness. It is not among the four sections § 10.52(a)(2) makes violable recklessly or through gross incompetence.
"Any matter" is unrestricted — examinations, collection, appeals, rulings, disciplinary inquiries.
The client's instruction is not a defence.
It is usually charged with something else — § 10.20, § 10.51(a)(12), § 10.34(b)(2).
Delay in court has its own penalty. IRC § 6673(a)(1).
How this has changed
Section 10.23 has been carried forward essentially unchanged through every modern revision of Circular 230, including T.D. 9011 (2002), T.D. 9359 (2007) and T.D. 9527 (2011). Its stability is a function of its generality: a rule that turns entirely on reasonableness needs no amendment as practice changes around it. What has grown up beside it is more specific — § 10.34(b)(2)(i)‘s bar on advising a submission whose purpose is delay came from the 2007 rewrite, and IRC § 6702’s specified frivolous submission branch, which catches the client’s side of the same conduct, came from the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006.
Exam focus
Know the rule verbatim; it is one sentence and it is quotable. Know that the standard is unreasonableness rather than any period, and that “any matter” is unrestricted. Know that a willful violation is sanctionable under § 10.52(a)(1) and that § 10.23 is not in the § 10.52(a)(2) list. Be able to name the provisions usually charged alongside it. Expect § 6673’s court sanctions as the second half of a question.
Check yourself
1. Circular 230 § 10.23 prohibits a practitioner from: (A) Delaying a matter beyond 30 days (B) Unreasonably delaying the prompt disposition of any matter before the IRS (C) Any delay whatever (D) Delaying only in collection matters Answer: B.
2. A practitioner delays because the client instructs him to, hoping the collection statute will expire. This is: (A) Permissible, the client’s instruction governing (B) A violation of § 10.23, and the instruction is no defence (C) Permissible if disclosed to the IRS (D) A matter for the client alone Answer: B.
3. Section 10.23 may be violated: (A) Recklessly or through gross incompetence, like §§ 10.34 to 10.37 (B) Only willfully, since § 10.52(a)(2) does not list it (C) Without any mental state (D) Only where actual harm results Answer: B.
4. An enrolled agent misses deadlines through genuine illness, then contacts the examiner and agrees a revised schedule. This is: (A) A violation, deadlines having been missed (B) Not unreasonable delay (C) A violation unless the IRS agrees in writing (D) A violation of § 10.20 Answer: B.
5. A practitioner advises a client to file a paper whose purpose is to postpone collection. Beyond § 10.23, this engages: (A) Section 10.20(a) (B) Section 10.34(b)(2)(i), and potentially IRC § 6702 for the client (C) Section 10.28 (D) Section 10.31 Answer: B.
Change log
- Initial publication from Circular 230 § 10.23.