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Representation before the IRS · Building the Taxpayer's Case: Preliminary Work

Conflict of interest in regards to representation

Verification 2026 Verified
tax year · reviewed 2026-08-18 · I. Ohu

Conflicts arise constantly in tax practice and almost never announce themselves. A married couple splitting up, a corporation and its officer facing a trust fund recovery penalty, two partners whose interests diverge once an adjustment lands, a client whose fee is contingent on an outcome the practitioner also has a stake in — each is a conflict under Circular 230 § 10.29, and each is representable only if three conditions are met. The rule is short, mechanical, and where practitioners get caught it is almost always on the paperwork rather than the judgment.

The rule

The prohibition. “Except as provided by paragraph (b) of this section, a practitioner shall not represent a client before the Internal Revenue Service if the representation involves a conflict of interest” (Circular 230 § 10.29(a)).

The two definitions. See the figures table (§ 10.29(a)(1)–(2)). A conflict exists if either the representation of one client “will be directly adverse to another client,” or there is a “significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited” by the practitioner’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person, or by a personal interest of the practitioner.

Note what the second limb reaches: a former client, a person who is not a client at all, and the practitioner’s own interest. The rule is not confined to two current clients on opposite sides.

The exception, and its three conditions. See the figures table (§ 10.29(b)). All three must hold:

  1. The practitioner reasonably believes they “will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client”;
  2. The representation “is not prohibited by law”; and
  3. Each affected client waives the conflict and gives informed consent, confirmed in writing by each affected client, “at the time the existence of the conflict of interest is known by the practitioner.”

The 30-day rule. “The confirmation may be made within a reasonable period after the informed consent, but in no event later than 30 days” (§ 10.29(b)(3)). So consent may be given orally first, but the written confirmation has an outside limit.

Retention and production. See the figures table (§ 10.29(c)). Copies of the written consents must be retained “for at least 36 months from the date of the conclusion of the representation of the affected clients,” and “must be provided to any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service on request.”

The competence limb is a real test. Condition (b)(1) borrows the standard in Circular 230 § 10.35 — see the figures table — which requires “the appropriate level of knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation necessary for the matter.” A practitioner who cannot honestly say they can act competently and diligently for each affected client cannot cure that with consent.

Current figures

ItemRuleAuthority
What is a conflict2 — the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client, or there is a significant risk that representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the practitioner's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person, or by a personal interest of the practitionerTY2026Circular 230 § 10.29(a)
When representation is still permitted3 conditions — the practitioner reasonably believes they can provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client; the representation is not prohibited by law; and each affected client waives the conflict and gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, at the time the conflict is known, with the written confirmation made within a reasonable period and in no event later than 30 daysTY2026Circular 230 § 10.29(b)
Retention of consentscopies of the written consents must be retained for at least 36 months from the date the representation of the affected clients concluded, and must be provided to any IRS officer or employee on requestTY2026Circular 230 § 10.29(c)
Competencethe appropriate level of knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation necessary for the matter for which the practitioner is engaged — attainable through various methods, such as consulting with experts in the relevant area or studying the relevant lawTY2026Circular 230 § 10.35

How it works in practice

Screen at intake, and screen again when facts change. Most conflicts are not present at engagement and appear when a fact emerges — an adjustment that falls on one spouse, an officer who signed the payroll cheques, a partner who took a distribution the others did not know about. The obligation attaches “at the time the existence of the conflict of interest is known by the practitioner,” so the clock starts when you find out, not when you were engaged.

Consent must be informed, which means explaining what the client is giving up. A signature on a boilerplate paragraph is not informed consent. The client needs to understand who else is being represented, how their interests diverge, what the practitioner will not be able to do for them because of it, and that they may take separate representation instead. Write that down in the consent itself; it is also the evidence that the consent was informed.

Thirty days is an outside limit, not a target. Get the written confirmation at the time. The rule permits a reasonable period after oral informed consent precisely because conflicts surface mid-conversation — but a consent confirmed on day 29 invites the question of what the practitioner did in the meantime.

Thirty-six months runs from the end of the representation, not from the consent. The retention period is measured “from the date of the conclusion of the representation of the affected clients.” On a long engagement that can be years after the consent was signed. File consents where the engagement file closes, not where the correspondence goes.

The IRS can ask for them, and you must hand them over. Section 10.29(c) requires the consents to be provided to any IRS officer or employee on request. That is not a subpoena and there is no discretion in it. A practitioner who took consent orally and never confirmed it in writing has nothing to produce, and the failure is visible.

Joint returns are the everyday case. Preparing or representing on a joint return involves two clients whose interests can diverge the moment an innocent spouse issue, an allocation question or a separation appears. It is not automatically a conflict, but it becomes one quickly and the practitioner should be alert to the trigger rather than assuming the joint filing settles it.

The entity and the individual are different clients. Representing a corporation does not mean representing its officers, and the trust fund recovery penalty is where that divides sharply: the corporation’s interest may be served by an allocation that increases an officer’s personal exposure. Decide early who the client is, say so in writing, and treat the other as unrepresented.

A personal interest counts. The second limb includes a “personal interest of the practitioner” — a fee arrangement, a business relationship with one party, a family connection, an interest in the transaction being examined. These are the conflicts practitioners are least likely to spot because they are looking at the clients rather than at themselves.

The couple who separated mid-examination

An enrolled agent represents a married couple in an examination of their joint return. Four months in, the spouses separate, and one tells the agent privately that the omitted income was the other's and that she knew nothing about it.

Analysis. A conflict now exists on both limbs — the representation of one is directly adverse to the other on the innocent spouse question, and the agent's responsibilities to each materially limit what can be done for the other. The obligation arose when the agent learned of it. Continuing requires the agent reasonably to believe competent and diligent representation of each is possible, that it is not prohibited by law, and written informed consent from both within 30 days. On these facts the honest answer to the first condition is usually no, and the right course is to withdraw from representing at least one.

The corporation and its officer

A practitioner represents a small corporation with unpaid payroll taxes. The revenue officer begins a trust fund recovery penalty investigation of the operations manager, who also asks the practitioner to represent her personally.

Analysis. Directly adverse. The corporation's position may be that the manager was the responsible person; hers is that she was not. Circular 230 § 10.29(a)(1) is engaged, and (a)(2) as well. The practitioner may act for both only on the three conditions in § 10.29(b), and the first — competent and diligent representation of each — is very hard to satisfy where the factual case for one is the case against the other. Identify the client, confirm it in writing, and tell the other to obtain separate representation.

The consent that was never written down

A practitioner identified a conflict, explained it fully to both clients, obtained clear oral consent from each, and continued. Two years later, after the representation ended, an OPR enquiry asks for the written consents.

Analysis. There is nothing to produce, and that is the violation. Section 10.29(b)(3) requires informed consent "confirmed in writing by each affected client," with the confirmation made no later than 30 days; § 10.29(c) requires copies to be retained at least 36 months from the conclusion of the representation and provided to any IRS officer or employee on request. The quality of the oral explanation does not cure the absence of the document — and the retention period had not expired.

The former client

A practitioner is asked to represent a new client in a dispute whose facts turn on a transaction the practitioner advised on three years ago for a different client, no longer represented.

Analysis. The second limb reaches this. A conflict exists where there is a significant risk that the representation will be materially limited by the practitioner's responsibilities to "another client, a former client or a third person." The former client's confidences constrain what the practitioner can use or argue. Whether that materially limits the new representation is a judgment, but it is the right question — and if the answer is yes, the § 10.29(b) conditions apply, including consent from each affected client.

A conflict can involve a former client, a third person, or the practitioner’s own interest — not only two current clients on opposite sides.

All three § 10.29(b) conditions must be met. Consent alone does not cure a conflict where competent and diligent representation of each client is not possible.

Written confirmation within 30 days, retained 36 months — measured from the conclusion of the representation, not from the consent.

Consents must be produced to any IRS officer or employee on request. There is no discretion and no process required.

How this has changed

Section 10.29 in its current form dates from 2007. The section is “applicable on September 26, 2007” (T.D. 9359), and that revision brought Circular 230 into line with the professional conduct rules lawyers and accountants already worked under — the directly-adverse and materially-limited formulation, the informed consent confirmed in writing, and the 30-day and 36-month periods. Material describing a looser standard is pre-2007.

Competence became a separate obligation in 2014. Circular 230 § 10.35 is “applicable beginning June 12, 2014” (T.D. 9668). Before that revision § 10.35 was the covered opinion rule, and competence as a free-standing duty did not exist in those terms. That matters here because § 10.29(b)(1) is measured against it: the first condition for acting despite a conflict now points at a defined standard rather than at a practitioner’s self-assessment.

Reliance on others was addressed at the same time. Circular 230 § 10.22(b), also applicable from 12 June 2014, presumes due diligence where a practitioner relies on another person’s work product and used reasonable care in engaging, supervising, training and evaluating them. It matters to conflicts because staffing a matter around a conflict does not remove the practitioner’s own responsibility.

The covered opinion rules were removed in the same 2014 revision. Practitioners who trained before it will remember § 10.35 as a long and detailed opinion standard. It is now two sentences on competence, and the old covered opinion apparatus is gone.

Exam focus

Know the two definitions of a conflict: directly adverse to another client, or a significant risk of being materially limited by responsibilities to another client, a former client, a third person, or the practitioner’s own personal interest.

Know that representation is permitted despite a conflict only if all three conditions in § 10.29(b) are met — reasonable belief in competent and diligent representation of each affected client, not prohibited by law, and informed consent confirmed in writing by each.

Know the 30 days: written confirmation may follow oral informed consent within a reasonable period but no later than that.

Know the 36 months: consents are retained at least that long from the conclusion of the representation, and must be given to any IRS officer or employee on request.

Know that competence under § 10.35 is the appropriate level of knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation, attainable by consulting experts or studying the law.

Know that the duty attaches when the practitioner knows of the conflict — which is usually mid-engagement, not at intake.

Check yourself

1. Which of these is a conflict of interest under Circular 230 § 10.29? (A) Only where two current clients are directly adverse (B) Also where a significant risk exists that representation will be materially limited by duties to a former client, a third person, or the practitioner’s personal interest (C) Only where the clients are related (D) Only where the practitioner is paid by one of them Answer: B. The second limb reaches former clients, non-clients and the practitioner’s own interest.

2. What must accompany a client’s waiver of a conflict? (A) Nothing further (B) Oral informed consent (C) Informed consent confirmed in writing by each affected client, no later than 30 days (D) Approval from the Office of Professional Responsibility Answer: C. And the practitioner must also reasonably believe competent and diligent representation of each is possible, and the representation must not be prohibited by law.

3. How long must written consents be retained? (A) 12 months from the date of consent (B) 30 days (C) At least 36 months from the conclusion of the representation of the affected clients (D) Indefinitely Answer: C. And they must be provided to any IRS officer or employee on request.

4. A practitioner cannot honestly believe they can act competently and diligently for both clients, but both give written informed consent. May the practitioner act? (A) Yes — consent cures the conflict (B) Yes, if the consents are retained (C) No — all three conditions in § 10.29(b) must be satisfied (D) Yes, with OPR approval Answer: C. Consent is one condition of three, not a substitute for the others.

5. When does the obligation to address a conflict arise? (A) At engagement, always (B) At the time the existence of the conflict is known by the practitioner (C) When the IRS raises it (D) When the client objects Answer: B. Which is usually mid-engagement, as facts emerge.

Change log

  • Initial publication from Circular 230 §§ 10.29, 10.22 and 10.35, each opened at source.

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